Abstract. In 2009, Abdalla et al. proposed a reasonably practical password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) secure against adaptive adversaries in the universal composability (UC) framework. It exploited the Canetti-Fischlin methodology for commitments and the Cramer-Shoup smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs), following the Gennaro-Lindell approach for PAKE. In this paper, we revisit the notion of non-interactive commitments, with a new formalism that implies UC security. In addition, we provide a quite efficient instantiation. We then extend our formalism to SPHF-friendly commitments. We thereafter show that it allows a blackbox application to oneround PAKE and oblivious transfer (OT), still secure in the UC framework against adaptive adversaries, assuming reliable erasures and a single global common reference string, even for multiple sessions. Our instantiations are more efficient than the Abdalla et al. PAKE in Crypto 2009 and the recent OT protocol proposed by Choi et al. in PKC 2013. Furthermore, the new PAKE instantiation is the first one-round scheme achieving UC security against adaptive adversaries.
Introduction
Commitment schemes are one of the most fundamental primitives in cryptography, serving as a building block for many cryptographic applications such as zero-knowledge proofs [GMW91] and secure multi-party computation [GMW87] . In a typical commitment scheme, there are two main phases. In a commit phase, the committer computes a commitment C for some message x and sends it to the receiver. Then, in an opening phase, the committer releases some information δ to the receiver which allows the latter to verify that C was indeed a commitment of x. To be useful in practice, a commitment scheme should satisfy two basic security properties. The first one is hiding, which informally guarantees that no information about x is leaked through the commitment C. The second one is binding, which guarantees that the committer cannot generate a commitment C that can be successfully opened to two different messages. Smooth Projective Hash Functions (SPHFs) were introduced by Cramer and Shoup [CS02] as a means to design chosen-ciphertext-secure public-key encryption schemes. In addition to providing a more intuitive abstraction for their original public-key encryption scheme in [CS98] , the notion of SPHF also enabled new efficient instantiations of their scheme under different complexity assumptions, such as quadratic residuosity. Due to its usefulness, the notion of SPHF was later extended to several other contexts, such as password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) [GL03] , oblivious transfer (OT) [Kal05, CKWZ13] , and blind signatures [BPV12,BBC + 13]. Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols were proposed in 1992 by Bellovin and Merritt [BM92] where authentication is done using a simple password, possibly drawn from a small space subject to exhaustive search. Since then, many schemes have been proposed and studied. SPHFs have been extensively used, starting with the work of Gennaro and Lindell [GL03] which generalized an earlier construction by Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung (KOY) [KOY01], and followed by several other works [CHK + 05,ACP09]. More recently, a variant of SPHFs proposed by Katz and Vaikuntanathan even allowed the construction of one-round PAKE schemes [KV11,BBC + 13].
The first ideal functionality for PAKE protocols in the UC framework [Can01,CK02] was proposed by Canetti et al. [CHK + 05] , who showed how a simple variant of the Gennaro-Lindell methodology [GL03] could lead to a secure protocol. Though quite efficient, their protocol was not known to be secure against adaptive adversaries, that are capable of corrupting players at any time, and learn their internal states. The first ones to propose an adaptively secure PAKE in the UC framework were Barak et al. [BCL + 05] using general techniques Basic Properties. In addition to the binding and hiding properties, certain applications may require additional properties from a commitment scheme. One such property is equivocability [Bea96] , which guarantees that a commitment C can be opened in more than a single way when in possession of a certain trapdoor information. Another one is extractability, which allows the computation of the message x committed in C when in possession of a certain trapdoor information. Yet another property that may also be useful for cryptographic applications is non-malleability [DDN00], which ensures that the receiver of a unopened commitment C for a message x cannot generate a commitment for a message that is related to x.
Though commitment schemes satisfying stronger properties such as non-malleability, equivocability, and extractability may be useful for solving specific problems, they usually stop short of guaranteeing security when composed with arbitrary protocols. To address this problem, Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] proposed an ideal functionality for commitment schemes in the universal composability (UC) framework [Can01] which guarantees all these properties simultaneously and remain secure even under concurrent compositions with arbitrary protocols. Unfortunately, they also showed that such commitment schemes can only be realized if one makes additional setup assumptions, such as the existence of a common reference string (CRS) [CF01], random oracles [HMQ04], or secure hardware tokens [Kat07] . Equivocable and Extractable Commitments. As the work of Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] , this work also aims to build non-interactive commitment schemes which can simultaneously guarantee non-malleability, equivocability, and extractability properties. To this end, we first define a new notion of commitment scheme, called E 2 -commitments, for which there exists an alternative setup algorithm, whose output is computationally indistinguishable from that of a normal setup algorithm and which outputs a common trapdoor that allows for both equivocability and extractability: this trapdoor not only allows for the extraction of a committed message, but it can also be used to create simulated commitments which can be opened to any message.
To define the security of E 2 -schemes, we first extend the security notions of standard equivocable commitments and extractable commitments to the E 2 -commitment setting: Since the use of a common trapdoor for equivocability and extractability could potentially be exploited by an adversary to break the extractability or equivocability properties of an E 2 -commitment scheme, we define stronger versions of these notions, which account for the fact that the same trapdoor is used for both extractability or equivocability. In particular, in these stronger notions, the adversary is given oracle access to the simulated commitment and extractor algorithms.
Finally, after defining the security of E 2 -schemes, we further show that these schemes remain secure even under arbitrary composition with other cryptographic protocols. More precisely, we show that any E 2 -commitment scheme which meets the strong versions of the equivocability or extraction notions is a non-interactive UC-secure (multiple) commitment scheme in the presence of adaptive adversaries, assuming reliable erasures and a single global CRS. SPHF-Friendly Commitments. In this work, we are interested in building non-interactive E 2 -commitments, to which smooth projective hash functions can be efficiently associated. Unfortunately, achieving this goal is not so easy due to the equivocability property of E 2 -commitments. To understand why, let X be the domain of an SPHF function and let L be some underlying NP language such that it is computationally hard to distinguish a random element in L from a random element in X \ L. A key property of these SPHF functions that makes them so useful for applications such as PAKE and OT is that, for words C in L, their values can be computed using either a secret hashing key hk or a public projected key hp together a witness w to the fact that C is indeed in L. A typical example of a language in which we are interested is the language L x corresponding to the set of elements {C} such that C is a valid commitment of x. Unfortunately, when commitments are equivocable, the language L x containing the set of valid commitments of x may not be well defined since a commitment C could potentially be opened to any x. To get around this problem and be able to use SPHFs with E 2 -commitments, we show that it suffices for an E 2 -commitment scheme to satisfy two properties. The first one is the stronger version of the equivocability notion, which guarantees that equivocable commitments are computationally indistinguishable from normal commitments, even when given oracle access to the simulated commitment and extractor algorithms. The second one, which is called robustness, is new and guarantees that commitments generated by polynomially-bounded adversaries are perfectly binding. Finally, we say that a commitment scheme is SPHF-friendly if it satisfies both properties and if it admits an SPHF on the languages L x .
Contributions
A new SPHF-friendly E 2 -commitment construction. First, we define the notion of SPHF-friendly E 2 -commitment together with an instantiation. The new construction, which is called E 2 C and described in Section 4, is inspired by the commitment schemes in [CF01, CLOS02, ACP09] . Like the construction in [ACP09], it combines a variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme (as an extractable commitment scheme) and an equivocable commitment scheme to be able to simultaneously achieve both equivocability and extractability. However, unlike the construction in [ACP09], we rely on Haralambiev's perfectly hiding commitment [Har11, Section 4.1.4], instead of the Pedersen commitment [Ped92] .
Since the opening value of Haralambiev's scheme is a group element that can be encrypted in one ElGamallike ciphertext to allow extractability, this globally leads to a better communication and computational complexity for the commitment. The former is linear in m · K, where m is the bit-length of the committed value and K, the security parameter. This is significantly better than the extractable commitment construction in [ACP09] which was linear in m · K 2 , but asymptotically worse than the two proposals in [FLM11] that are linear in K, and thus independent of m. However, we point out the latter proposals in [FLM11] are not SPHF-friendly since they are not robust.
We then show in Theorem 4 that a labeled E 2 -commitment satisfying stronger notions of equivocability and extractability is a non-interactive UC-secure commitment scheme in the presence of adaptive adversaries, assuming reliable erasures and a single global CRS, and we apply this result to our new construction. One-round adaptively secure PAKE. Second, we provide a generic construction of a one-round UC-secure PAKE from any SPHF-friendly commitment. The UC-security holds against adaptive adversaries, assuming reliable erasures and a single global CRS, as shown in Section 6. In addition to being the first one-round adaptively secure PAKE, our new scheme also enjoys a much better communication complexity than previous adaptively secure PAKE schemes. For instance, in comparison to the PAKE in [ACP09], which is currently the most efficient adaptively secure PAKE, the new scheme gains a factor of K in the overall communication complexity, where K is the security parameter. However, unlike their scheme, our new construction requires pairing-friendly groups. Three-round adaptively secure 1-out-of-k OT. Third, we provide a generic construction of a threeround UC-secure 1-out-of-k OT from any SPHF-friendly commitment. The UC-security holds against adaptive adversaries, assuming reliable erasures and a single global CRS, as shown in Section 7. Besides decreasing the total number of rounds with respect to existing OT schemes with similar security levels, our resulting protocol also has a better communication complexity than the best known solution so far [CKWZ13] . Moreover, our construction is more general and provides a solution for 1-out-of-k OT schemes while the solution in [CKWZ13] only works for k = 2.
Due to space restrictions, complete proofs and some details were postponed to the Appendix.
Basic Notions for Commitments
We first review the basic definitions of non-interactive commitments, with some examples. Then, we consider the classical additional notions of equivocability and extractability. In this paper, the qualities of adversaries will be measured by their successes and advantages in certain experiments Exp sec or Exp sec-b (between the cases b = 0 and b = 1), denoted Succ sec (A, K) and Adv sec (A, K) respectively, while the security of a primitive will be measured by the maximal successes or advantages of any adversary running within a time bounded by some t in the appropriate experiments, denoted Succ sec (t) and Adv sec (t) respectively. Adversaries can keep state during the different phases. We denote $ ← the outcome of a probabilistic algorithm or the sampling from a uniform distribution. See Appendix A.1 for more details.
Non-Interactive Labeled Commitments
A non-interactive labeled commitment scheme C is defined by three algorithms:
-SetupCom(1 K ) takes as input the security parameter K and outputs the global parameters, passed through the CRS ρ to all other algorithms; -Com (x) takes as input a label and a message x, and outputs a pair (C, δ), where C is the commitment of x for the label , and δ is the corresponding opening data (a.k.a. decommitment information). This is a probabilistic algorithm; -VerCom (C, x, δ) takes as input a commitment C, a label , a message x, and the opening data δ and outputs 1 (true) if δ is a valid opening data for C, x and . It always outputs 0 (false) on x = ⊥. Figure 1 , one can state the basic properties: -Correctness: for all correctly generated CRS ρ, all commitments and opening data honestly generated pass the verification VerCom test: for all , x, if (C, δ)
Using the experiments Exp
, then VerCom (C, x, δ) = 1; -Hiding Property: the commitment does not leak any information about the committed value. C is said (t, ε)-hiding if Adv hid C (t) ≤ ε. -Binding Property: no adversary can open a commitment in two different ways. C is said (t, ε)-binding if Succ
Correctness is always perfectly required, and one can also require either the binding or the hiding property to be perfect. The reader can remark that labels are actually useless in the hiding and the binding properties. But they will become useful in E 2 -commitment schemes introduced in the next section. This is somehow similar to encryption scheme: labels are useless with encryption schemes which are just IND-CPA, but are very useful with IND-CCA encryption schemes.
Perfectly Binding Commitments: Public-Key Encryption
To get perfectly binding commitments, classical instantiations are public-key encryption schemes, which additionally provide extractability (see below). The encryption algorithm is indeed the commitment algorithm, and the random coins become the opening data that allow to check the correct procedure of the commit phase. The hiding property relies on the indistinguishability (IND-CPA), which is computationally achieved, whereas the binding property relies on the correctness of the encryption scheme and is perfect.
Let us define the ElGamal-based commitment scheme:
-SetupCom(1 K ) chooses a cyclic group G of prime order p, g a generator for this group and a random scalar z
This commitment scheme is hiding under the DDH assumption and perfectly binding. It is even extractable using the decryption key z: M = e/u z . However, it is not labeled. The Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98] admits labels and is extractable and non-malleable, thanks to the IND-CCA security level. It is reviewed in Appendix B, with some extensions, since we will use it later in our applications.
Perfectly Hiding Commitments
The Pedersen scheme [Ped92] is the most famous perfectly hiding commitment: Com(m) = g m h r for a random scalar r $ ← Z p and a fixed basis h ∈ G. The binding property relies on the DL assumption. Unfortunately, the opening value is the scalar r, which makes it hard to encrypt/decrypt efficiently, as required in our construction below. Haralambiev [Har11, Section 4.1.4] recently proposed a new commitment scheme, called TC4 (without label), with a group element as opening value:
-SetupCom(1 K ) chooses an asymmetric pairing-friendly setting (G 1 , g 1 , G 2 , g 2 , G T , p, e), with an additional independent generator T ∈ G 2 . It sets the CRS ρ = (G 1 , g 1 , G 2 , g 2 , T, G T , p, e); -Com(x), for x ∈ Z p , chooses a random element r $ ← Z p and outputs the pair (C = g r 2 T x , δ = g r 1 ); -VerCom(C, x, δ) checks whether e(g 1 , C/T x ) = e(δ, g 2 ).
This commitment scheme is clearly perfectly hiding, since the groups are cyclic, and for any C ∈ G 2 , x ∈ Z p , there exists δ ∈ G 1 that satisfies e(g 1 , C/T x ) = e(δ, g 2 ). More precisely, if C = g u 2 and T = g t 2 , then δ = g u−tx 1 opens C to any x. The binding property holds under the DDH assumption in G 2 , as proven in [Har11, Section 4.1.4].
Equivocable Commitments
An equivocable commitment scheme C extends on the previous definition, with SetupCom, Com, VerCom, and a second setup SetupComT(1 K ) that additionally outputs a trapdoor τ , and -SimCom (τ ) that takes as input the trapdoor τ and a label and outputs a pair (C, eqk), where C is a commitment and eqk an equivocation key; -OpenCom (eqk, C, x) that takes as input a commitment C, a label , a message x, and an equivocation key eqk for this commitment, and outputs an opening data δ for C and on x.
Let us denote SCom the algorithm that takes as input the trapdoor τ , a label and a message x and which outputs (C, δ)
, computed as (C, eqk) $ ← SimCom (τ ) and δ ← OpenCom (eqk, C, x). Three additional properties are then associated: a correctness property, and two indistinguishability properties, which all together imply the hiding property.
Fig. 2. Simulation Indistinguishability and Binding Extractability
-Trapdoor Correctness: all simulated commitments can be opened on any message: for all , x, if (C, eqk) $ ← SimCom (τ ) and δ ← OpenCom (eqk, C, x), then VerCom (C, x, δ) = 1; -Setup Indistinguishability: one cannot distinguish the CRS ρ generated by SetupCom from the one generated by SetupComT. C is said (t, ε)-setup-indistinguishable if the two distributions for ρ are (t, ε)-computationally indistinguishable. We denote Adv setup-ind C (t) the distance between the two distributions. -Simulation Indistinguishability: one cannot distinguish a real commitment (generated by Com) from a fake commitment (generated by SCom), even with oracle access to fake commitments. C is said (t, ε)- Figure 2 ).
More precisely, when the trapdoor correctness is satisfied, since commitments generated by SimCom are perfectly hiding (they can be opened in any way using OpenCom), Adv
Definition 1 (Equivocable Commitment). A commitment scheme C is said (t, ε)-equivocable if, first, the basic commitment scheme satisfies the correctness property and is both (t, ε)-binding and (t, ε)-hiding, and, secondly, the additional algorithms guarantee the trapdoor correctness and make it both (t, ε)-setupindistinguishable and (t, ε)-simulation-indistinguishable. (t); it should be upperbounded by ε.
Extractable Commitments
An extractable commitment scheme C also extends on the initial definition, with SetupCom, Com, VerCom, as well as the second setup SetupComT(1 K ) that additionally outputs a trapdoor τ , and -ExtCom (τ, C) which takes as input the trapdoor τ , a commitment C, and a label , and outputs the committed message x, or ⊥ if the commitment is invalid.
As above, three additional properties are then associated: a correctness property, and the setup indistinguishability, but also an extractability property, which implies, together with the setup indistinguishability, the binding property:
-Trapdoor Correctness: all commitments honestly generated can be correctly extracted: for all , x, if
; -Setup Indistinguishability: as above; -Binding Extractability: one cannot fool the extractor, i.e., produce a commitment and a valid opening data to an input x while the commitment does not extract to x. C is said (t, ε)-binding-extractable if Succ Figure 2 ).
More precisely, when one breaks the binding property with (C, , x 0 , δ 0 , x 1 , δ 1 ), if the extraction oracle outputs x = x 0 , then one can output (C, , x 1 , δ 1 ), otherwise one can output (C, , x 0 , δ 0 ). In both cases, this breaks the binding-extractability:
Definition 2 (Extractable Commitment). A commitment scheme C is said (t, ε)-extractable if, first, the basic commitment scheme satisfies the correctness property and is both (t, ε)-binding and (t, ε)-hiding, Public-key encryption schemes are perfectly binding commitments that are additionally extractable. The Pedersen and Haralambiev commitments are perfectly hiding commitments that are additionally equivocable. But none of them have the two properties at the same time. This is now our goal.
Definition 3 (E 2 -Commitment). A commitment scheme C is said (t, ε)-E 2 (equivocable and extractable) if the indistinguishable setup algorithm outputs a common trapdoor that allows both equivocability and extractability. If one denotes Adv But with such a common trapdoor, the adversary could exploit the equivocation queries to break extractability and extraction queries to break equivocability. Stronger notions can thus be defined, using the experiments Exp Figure 3 , in which SCom is supposed to store each query/answer ( , x, C) in a list Λ and ExtCom-queries on such an SCom-output ( , C) are answered by x (as it would be when using Com instead of SCom).
-Strong Simulation Indistinguishability: one cannot distinguish a real commitment (generated by Com) from a fake commitment (generated by SCom), even with oracle access to the extraction oracle (ExtCom) and to fake commitments (using SCom). C is said (t, ε)-strongly-simulation-indistinguishable if Adv
-Strong Binding Extractability (informally introduced in [CLOS02] as "simulation extractability"): one cannot fool the extractor, i.e., produce a commitment and a valid opening data (not given by SCom) to an input x while the commitment does not extract to x, even with oracle access to the extraction oracle (ExtCom) and to fake commitments (using SCom). C is said (t, ε)-strongly-binding-extractable if Succ
They both imply the respective weaker notions since they just differ by giving access to the ExtCom-oracle in the former game, and to the SCom oracle in the latter. We insist that ExtCom-queries on SCom-outputs are answered by the related SCom-inputs. Otherwise, the former game would be void. In addition, VerCom always rejects inputs with x = ⊥, which is useful in the latter game.
UC-Secure Commitments
The security definition for commitment schemes in the UC framework was presented by Canetti and Fischlin [CF01], refined by Canetti [Can05] . The ideal functionality is presented in Figure 4 , where a public
The functionality Fcom is parametrized by a security parameter k. It interacts with an adversary S and a set of parties P1,. . . ,Pn via the following queries: delayed output is an output first sent to the adversary S that eventually decides if and when the message is actually delivered to the recipient. In case of corruption of the committer, if this is before the Receipt-message for the receiver, the adversary chooses the committed value, otherwise it is provided by the ideal functionality, according to the Commit-message. Note this is actually the multiple-commitment functionality that allows multiple executions of the commitment protocol (multiple ssid's) for the same functionality instance (one sid). This avoids the use of joint-state UC [CR03].
Theorem 4. A labeled E 2 -commitment scheme C, that is in addition strongly-simulation-indistinguishable or strongly-binding-extractable, is a non-interactive UC-secure commitment scheme in the presence of adaptive adversaries, assuming reliable erasures and authenticated channels. More precisely, for any environment, its advantage in distinguishing the ideal world (with the ideal functionality from Figure 4 ) and the real world (with the commitment scheme C) is bounded by both Adv
where q s is the number of concurrent sessions and t its running time.
Proof. The full proof with the cost of the reduction are given in Appendix D, but let us provide here the simulator:
-when receiving a commitment C from the adversary, and thus either freshly generated by the adversary or a replay of a commitment C generated by the simulator in another session (with a different label), the simulator extracts the committed value x, and uses it to send a Commit message to the ideal functionality. A dummy value is used in case of bad extraction; -when receiving a Receipt-message, which means that an honest player has committed a value, the simulator generates (C, eqk) $ ← SimCom (τ ), with = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ), to send C during the commit phase of the honest player; -when receiving (x, δ), if the verification succeeds, the simulator asks for a Reveal query to the ideal functionality; -when receiving a Revealed-message on x, it then generates δ ← OpenCom (eqk, C, x) to actually open the commitment.
Any corruption just reveals x earlier, which allows a correct simulation of the opening.
4 A Construction of Labeled E 2 -Commitment Scheme
Labeled Cramer-Shoup Encryption on Vectors
For our construction we use a variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme for vectors of messages. Let G be a cyclic group of order p, with two independent generators g and h. The secret decryption key is a random vector sk = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z) $ ← Z 5 p and the public encryption key is pk = (g, h, c = g
, where H is randomly chosen in a collision-resistant hash function family H (actually, second-preimage resistance is enough). For a message-
is the same for all the w i 's to ensure non-malleability contrary to what we would have if we had just concatenated Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts of the , for i = 1, . . . , m. This multi-Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, denoted MCS, is IND-CCA under the DDH assumption. It even verifies a stronger property VIND-PO-CCA (for Vector-Indistinguishability with Partial Opening under ChosenCiphertext Attacks), where the random coins r i , of the common coordinates in the two challenge vectors, are published with the challenge ciphertext (partial-opening of the random coins, see Appendix B for more details). This will be useful for the security proof of our commitment E 2 C (see below):
where m is the length of the encrypted vectors, q d is the maximal number of decryption queries, and γ the bound on the number of distinct components in the two challenge vectors; and where Adv ddh G and Succ coll H (t) are respectively the maximum advantage of an adversary against the DDH problem and the maximum probability for an adversary to find a collision for H $ ← H, in time t.
Construction
In this section, we provide a concrete construction E 2 C, inspired from [CF01,CLOS02,ACP09], with the above multi-Cramer-Shoup encryption (as an extractable commitment scheme) and the TC4 Haralambiev's equivocable commitment scheme [Har11, Section 4.1.4]. The latter will allow equivocability while the former will provide extractability:
, with another independent generator h 1 of G 1 . It then generates the parameters of a Cramer-Shoup-based commitment in G 1 :
← H, and sets pk = (g 1 , h 1 , c = g
It then chooses a random scalar t $ ← Z p , and sets T = g t 2 . The CRS ρ is set as (pk, T ) and the trapdoor τ is the decryption key (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z) (a.k.a. extraction trapdoor) together with t (a.k.a. equivocation trapdoor). For SetupCom(1 K ), the CRS is generated the same way, but forgetting the scalars, and thus without any trapdoor; -Com (M ), for M = (M i ) i ∈ {0, 1} m and a label , works as follows:
• For i = 1, . . . , m, it chooses a random scalar r i,M i $ ← Z p , sets r i,1−M i = 0, and commits to M i , using the TC4 commitment scheme with r i,M i as randomness:
for j = 0, 1, which makes d i,M i the opening value for a i to M i ; Let us also write a = (a 1 , . . . , a m ), the tuple of commitments.
p , and = ( , a). The commitment is C = (a, b), and the opening information is the m-tuple δ = (s 1,M 1 , . . . , s m,Mm ). 
takes as input the equivocation trapdoor, namely t, and outputs C = (a, b) and eqk = s, where • For i = 1, . . . , m, it chooses a random scalar r i,0 $ ← Z p , sets r i,1 = r i,0 − t, and commits to both 0 and 1, using the TC4 commitment scheme with r i,0 and r i,1 as respective randomness:
for j = 0, 1, which makes d i,j the opening value for a i to the value j ∈ {0, 1}. This leads to a; • b is built as above:
-OpenCom (eqk, C, M ) simply extracts the useful values from eqk = s to make the opening value δ = (
-ExtCom (τ, C) takes as input the extraction trapdoor, namely the Cramer-Shoup decryption key. Given b, it can decrypt all the b i,j into d i,j and check whether e(g 1 , a i /T j ) = e(d i,j , g 2 ) or not. If, for each i, exactly one j = M i satisfies the equality, then the extraction algorithm outputs (M i ) i , otherwise (no correct decryption or ambiguity with several possibilities) it outputs ⊥.
Security Properties
The above commitment scheme E 2 C is a labeled E 2 -commitment, with both strong-simulation-indistinguishability and strong-binding-extractability, under the DDH assumptions in both G 1 and G 2 . It is thus a UC-secure commitment scheme. The stronger VIND-PO-CCA security notion for the encryption scheme is required because the SCom/Com oracle does not only output the commitment (and thus the ciphertexts) but also the opening values which include the random coins of the encryption, but just for the plaintext components that are the same in the two vectors, since the two vectors only differ for unnecessary data (namely the d i,1−M i 's) in the security proof. More details can be found in the full proof, in Appendix D, which leads to Adv
, where q c is the number of SCom-queries and q d the number of ExtCom-queries.
SPHF-Friendly Commitments

Smooth Projective Hash Functions
Projective hash function families were first introduced by Cramer and Shoup [CS02], but we here use the definitions of Gennaro and Lindell [GL03], provided to build secure password-based authenticated key exchange protocols, together with non-malleable commitments.
Let X be the domain of these functions and let L be a certain subset of this domain (a language). A key property of these functions is that, for words C in L, their values can be computed by using either a secret hashing key hk or a public projection key hp but with a witness w of the fact that C is indeed in L:
-HashKG(L) generates a hashing key hk for the language L; -ProjKG(hk, L, C) derives the projection key hp, possibly depending on the word C; -Hash(hk, L, C) outputs the hash value from the hashing key, on any word C ∈ X; -ProjHash(hp, L, C, w) outputs the hash value from the projection key hp, and the witness w, for C ∈ L.
The correctness of the SPHF assures that if C ∈ L with w a witness of this fact, then Hash(hk, L, C) = ProjHash(hp, L, C, w). On the other hand, the security is defined through the smoothness, which guarantees that, if C ∈ L, Hash(hk, L, C) is statistically indistinguishable from a random element, even knowing hp.
Note that HashKG and ProjKG can just depend partially on L (a superset L ) and not at all on C: we then note HashKG(L ) and ProjKG(hk, L , ⊥) (see [BBC + 13] for more details on GL-SPHF and KV-SPHF and language definitions).
Robust Commitments
For a long time, SPHFs have been used to implicitly check some statements, on language membership, such as "C indeed encrypts x". This easily extends to perfectly binding commitments with labels: L x = {( , C)| ∃δ, VerCom (C, x, δ) = 1}. But when commitments are equivocable, this intuitively means that a commitment C with the label contains any x and is thus in all the languages L x . In order to be able to use SPHFs with E 2 -commitments, we want the commitments generated by polynomially-bounded adversaries to be perfectly binding, and thus to belong to at most one language L x . We thus need a robust verification property for such E 2 -commitments.
Definition 5 (Robustness). One cannot produce a commitment and a label that extracts to x (possibly x = ⊥) such that there exists a valid opening data to a different input x, even with oracle access to the extraction oracle (ExtCom) and to fake commitments (using SCom). Figure 5 .
It is important to note that the latter experiment Exp robust A (K) may not be run in polynomial time. Robustness implies strong-binding-extractability.
Properties of SPHF-Friendly Commitments
We are now ready to define SPHF-friendly commitments, which admit an SPHF on the languages L x = {( , C)| ∃δ, VerCom (C, x, δ) = 1}, and to discuss about them:
Definition 6 (SPHF-Friendly Commitments). An SPHF-friendly commitment is an E 2 -commitment that admits an SPHF on the languages L x , and that is both strongly-simulation-indistinguishable and robust.
Let us consider such a family F of SPHFs on languages L x for x ∈ X, with X a non trivial set (with at least two elements), with hash values in the set G. From the smoothness of the SPHF on L x , one can derive the two following properties on SPHF-friendly commitments, modeled by the experiments in Figure 6 . The first notion of smoothness deals with adversary-generated commitments, that are likely perfectly binding from the robustness, while the second notion of pseudo-randomness deals with simulated commitments, that are perfectly hiding. They are inspired by the security games from [GL03].
In both security games, note that when hk and hp do not depend on x nor on C, and when the smoothness holds even if the adversary can choose C after having seen hp (i.e., the SPHF is actually a KV-SPHF [BBC + 13]), they can be generated from the beginning of the games, with hp given to the adversary much earlier.
Smoothness of SPHF-Friendly Commitments. If the adversary A, with access to the oracles SCom and ExtCom, outputs a fresh commitment ( , C) that extracts to x ← ExtCom (τ, C), then the robustness guarantees that for any x = x , ( , C) ∈ L x (excepted with small probability), and thus the distribution of the hash value is statistically indistinguishable from the random distribution, even when knowing hp. In the experiment Exp c-smooth A (K), we let the adversary choose x, and we have: Adv
Pseudo-Randomness of SPHF on Robust Commitments. If the adversary A is given a commitment C by SCom on x with label , both adversary-chosen, even with access to the oracles SCom and ExtCom, then for any x, it cannot distinguish the hash value of ( , C) on language L x from a random value, even being given hp, since C could have been generated as Com (x ) for some x = x, which excludes it to belong to L x , under the robustness. In the experiment Exp c-ps-rand A (K), we let the adversary choose ( , x), and we have: Adv
Our Commitment Scheme E 2 C is SPHF-Friendly
In order to be SPHF-friendly, the commitment first needs to be strongly-simulation-indistinguishable and robust. We have already shown the former property, and the latter is also proven in Appendix D. One additionally needs an SPHF able to check the verification equation: using the notations from Section 4.2, C = (a, b) 
Since e is non-degenerated, we can eliminate the need of d i,M i , by lifting everything in G T , and checking that, first, the ciphertexts are all valid:
and, second, the plaintexts satisfy the appropriate relations:
From these expressions we derive several constructions of such SPHFs in Appendix C, and focus here on the most interesting ones for the following applications:
-First, when C is sent in advance (known when generating hp), as in the OT protocol described in Section 7, for hk = (η, α, β, µ, ε)
-Then, when C is not necessarily known for computing hp, as in the one-round PAKE, described in Section 6,
Complexity and Comparisons
As summarized in Table 1 , the communication complexity is linear in m · K (where m is the bit-length of the committed value and K is the security parameter), which is much better than [ACP09] that was linear in m · K 2 , but asymptotically worse than the two proposals in [FLM11] that are linear in K, and thus independent of m (as long as m = O(K)). Comparison with existing non-interactive UC-secure commitments with a single global CRS (m = bit-length of the committed value, K = security parameter)
a slight variant without one-time signature but using labels for the IND-CCA security of the multi-Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts, as in our new scheme, and supposing that an element in the cyclic group G has size 2K, to withstand generic attacks.
Basically, the first scheme in [FLM11] consists of a Cramer-Shoup-like encryption C of the message x, and a perfectly-sound Groth-Sahai [GS08] NIZK π that C contains x. The actual commitment is C and the opening value on x is δ = π. The trapdoor-setup provides the Cramer-Shoup decryption key and changes the Groth-Sahai setup to the perfectly-hiding setting. The indistinguishable setups of the Groth-Sahai mixed commitments ensure the setup-indistinguishability. The extraction algorithm uses the Cramer-Shoup decryption algorithm, while the equivocation uses the simulator of the NIZK. The IND-CCA security notion for C and the computational soundness of π make it strongly-binding-extractable, the IND-CCA security notion and the zero-knowledge property of the NIZK provide the strong-simulation-indistinguishability. It is thus UC-secure. However, the verification is not robust: because of the perfectly-hiding setting of Groth-Sahai proofs, for any ciphertext C and for any message x, there exists a proof π that makes the verification of C on x. As a consequence, it is not SPHF-friendly. The second construction is in the same vein: they cannot be used in the following applications.
6 Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
A Generic Construction
The ideal functionality of a Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) is depicted in Appendix A.3. It has been proposed in [CHK + 05] . In Figure 7 , we describe a one-round PAKE that is UC-secure against adaptive adversaries, assuming erasures. It can be built from any SPHF-friendly commitment scheme (that is E 2 , strongly-simulation-indistinguishable, and robust as described in Section 5), if the SPHF is actually a KV-SPHF [BBC + 13] and the algorithms HashKG and ProjKG do not need to know the committed value π (nor the word ( , C) itself). We thus denote L π the language of the pairs ( , C), where C is a commitment that opens to π under the label , and L the union of all the L π (L does not depend on π). The proof of the following theorem, with the cost of the reduction, are given in Appendix D.
Protocol execution by Pi with πi: 
a with the commitment variant of note "a" of Table 1 . b OTS: one-time signature (public key size and signature size) to link the flows in the PAKE protocol.
Theorem 7. The Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange described on Figure 7 is UC-secure in the presence of adaptive adversaries, assuming erasures, as soon as the commitment scheme is SPHF-friendly with a KV-SPHF.
Concrete Instantiation
Using our commitment E 2 C introduced Section 4 together with the second SPHF described Section 5 (which satisfies the above requirements for HashKG and ProjKG), one gets a quite efficient protocol, described in Appendix E. More precisely, for m-bit passwords, each player has to send hp ∈ G 2m 1 and C ∈ G 8m 1 × G m 2 , which means 10m elements from G 1 and m elements from G 2 . In Table 2 , we compare our new scheme with some previous UC-secure PAKE.
Oblivious Transfer
A Generic Construction
The ideal functionality of an Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol is depicted in Appendix A.3. It is inspired from [CKWZ13]. In Figure 8 , we describe a 3-round OT that is UC-secure against adaptive adversaries, and a 2-round variant which is UC-secure against static adversaries. They can be built from any SPHF-friendly commitment scheme, where L t is the language of the commitments that open to t under the associated label , and from any IND-CPA encryption scheme E = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) with plaintext size at least K, and from any Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG) F with input size equal to plaintext size, and output size equal to the size of the messages in the database. Details on encryption schemes and PRGs can be found in Appendix A.2. Notice the adaptive version can be seen as a variant of the static version where the last flow is sent over a somewhat secure channel, as in [CKWZ13]; and the preflow and pk and c are used to create this somewhat secure channel. The proof of the following theorem, with the cost of the reduction, are given in Appendix D.
Theorem 8. The two Oblivous Transfer schemes described in Figure 8 are UC-secure in the presence of adaptive adversaries and static adversaries respectively, assuming reliable erasures and authenticated channels, as soon as the commitment scheme is SPHF-friendly.
Concrete Instantiation and Comparison
Using our commitment E 2 C introduced Section 4 together with the first SPHF described Section 5, one gets the protocol described in Appendix E, where the number of bits of the commited value is m = log k . For the statically secure version, the communication cost is, in addition to the database m that is sent in M in a masked way, 1 element of Z p and k elements of G 1 (for hp, by using the same scalar ε for all hp t 's) for the sender, while the receiver sends log k elements of G 2 (for a) and 8 log k elements of G 1 (for b), in only two rounds. In the particular case of k = 2, the scalar can be avoided since the message consists of 1 bit, so our construction just requires: 2 elements from G 1 for the sender, and 1 from G 2 and 8 from G 1 for the
Pre-flow (for adaptive security only): 1. Pi generates a key pair (pk, sk) $ ← KeyGen(param) for E 2. Pi stores sk, completely erase random coins used by KeyGen, and sends pk to Pi Index query on s:
1. Pj chooses a random value S, computes R ← F (S) and encrypts S under pk: c $ ← Encrypt(pk, S) (for adaptive security only; for static security: c =⊥, R = 0) 2. Pj computes (C, δ) $ ← Com (s) with = (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj) 3. Pj stores δ and completely erase R, S and random coins used by Com and Encrypt and sends C and c to Pi
Database input (m1, . . . , m k ):
1. Pi decrypts S ← Decrypt(sk, c) and gets R ← F (S) (for static security: Lt, ( , C)) , and Mt ← R ⊕ Kt ⊕ mt, for t = 1, . . . , k 3. Pi erases everything except (hp t , Mt) t=1,...,k and sends them over a secure channel Data recovery: Upon receiving (hp t , Mt) t=1,...,k , Pj computes Ks ← ProjHash(hp s , Ls, ( , C), δ) and gets ms ← R ⊕ Ks ⊕ Ms. receiver, in two rounds. For the same security level (static corruptions in the CRS, with erasures), the best known solution from [CKWZ13] required to send at least 23 group elements and 7 scalars, in 4 rounds. If adaptive security is required, our construction requires 3 additional elements in G 1 and 1 additional round, which gives a total of 13 elements in G 1 , in 3 rounds. This is also more efficient then the best known solution from [CKWZ13], which requires 26 group elements and 7 scalars, in 4 rounds.
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A Notations
We first recall the classical definitions on distances of distribution, and the notions of success and advantage. We then review the basic cryptographic tools, with the corresponding security notions.
A.1 Distances, Advantage and Success
Statistical Distance. Let D 0 and D 1 be two probability distributions over a finite set S and let X 0 and X 1 be two random variables with these two respective distributions. The statistical distance between D 0 and D 1 is also the statistical distance between X 0 and X 1 : (K) = 1 the advantage of this adversary. We additionally denote Adv sec (t) = max A≤t {Adv sec (A, K)}, the maximal advantage any adversary running within time t can get.
Computational Distance. Let D 0 and D 1 be two probability distributions over a finite set S and let X 0 and X 1 be two random variables with these two respective distributions. The computational distance between D 0 and D 1 is the best advantage an adversary can get in distinguishing X 0 from X 1 :
We can note that for two distributions D 0 and D 1 that are ε-close, for any t and ε, D 0 and D 1 are (t, ε)-computationally indistinguishable.
A.2 Formal Definitions of the Basic Primitives
Hash Function Family. A hash function family H is a family of functions H k from {0, 1} * to a fixed-length output, either {0, 1} K or Z p . Such a family is said collision-resistant if for any adversary A on a random function H $ ← H, it is hard to find a collision. More precisely, we denote
Labeled Encryption Scheme. A labeled public-key encryption scheme E is defined by four algorithms:
-Setup(1 K ), where K is the security parameter, generates the global parameters param of the scheme; -KeyGen(param) generates a pair of keys, the public encryption key pk and the private decryption key sk; -Encrypt (pk, m; r) produces a ciphertext c on the input message m ∈ M under the label and encryption key pk, using the random coins r; -Decrypt (sk, c) outputs the plaintext m encrypted in c under the label , or ⊥ for an invalid ciphertext.
An encryption scheme E should satisfy the following properties -Correctness: for all key pair (pk, sk), any label , all random coins r and all messages m, Decrypt (sk, Encrypt (pk, m; r)) = m.
-Indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks: this security notion IND-CCA can be formalized by the following experiments Exp ind-cca-b A (K), where the adversary A transfers some internal state state between the various calls FIND and GUESS, and makes use of the oracle ODecrypt:
• ODecrypt (c): This oracle outputs the decryption of c under the label and the challenge decryption key sk. The input queries ( , c) are added to the list CTXT.
According to the previous section, these experiments implicitly define the advantages Adv 
Pseudo-Random Generators (PRGs).
A pseudo-random generator (PRG) is a function F so that for a randomly chosen seed S $ ← {0, 1} K outputs a random-looking value in {0, 1} , for some > K. The quality of a PRG is measured by the computational distance Adv prg F (t) between the distributions of the outputs on random inputs from random values in {0, 1} .
A.3 Ideal Functionalities
UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer. The ideal functionality of an Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol is depicted in Figure 9 . It is inspired from [CKWZ13].
The functionality F (1,k)-OT is parameterized by a security parameter K. It interacts with an adversary S and a set of parties P1,. . . ,Pn via the following queries:
-Upon receiving an input (Send, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, (m1, . . . , mk)) from party Pi, with mi ∈ {0, 1} K : record the tuple (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, (m1, . . . , m k )) and reveal (Send, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj) to the adversary S. Ignore further Send-message with the same ssid from Pi.
-Upon receiving an input (Receive, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, s) from party Pj, with s ∈ {1, . . . , k}:
record the tuple (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, s), and reveal (Receive, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj) to the adversary S. Ignore further Receive-message with the same ssid from Pj. -Upon receiving a message (Sent, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj) from the adversary S: ignore the message if (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, (m1, . . . , m k )) or (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, s) is not recorded; otherwise send (Sent, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj) to Pi and ignore further Sent-message with the same ssid from the adversary. -Upon receiving a message (Received, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj) from the adversary S: ignore the message if (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, (m1, . . . , m k )) or (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, s) is not recorded; otherwise send (Received, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, ms) to Pj and ignore further Received-message with the same ssid from the adversary. UC-Secure Password-Authenticated Key Exchange. We present the PAKE ideal functionality F pwKE on Figure 10 ). It was described in [CHK + 05]. The main idea behind this functionality is as follows: If neither party is corrupted and the adversary does not attempt any password guess, then the two players both end up with either the same uniformly-distributed session key if the passwords are the same, or uniformly-distributed independent session keys if the passwords are distinct. In addition, the adversary does not know whether this is a success or not. However, if one party is corrupted, or if the adversary successfully guessed the player's
The functionality FpwKE is parameterized by a security parameter k. It interacts with an adversary S and a set of parties P1,. . . ,Pn via the following queries: -Upon receiving a query (NewSession, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, π) from party Pi: Send (NewSession, sid, ssid, Pi, Pj) to S. If this is the first NewSession query, or if this is the second NewSession query and there is a record (sid, ssid, Pj, Pi, π ), then record (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, π) and mark this record fresh. -Upon receiving a query (TestPwd, sid, ssid, Pi, π ) from the adversary S:
If there is a record of the form (Pi, Pj, π) which is fresh, then do: If pw = pw , mark the record compromised and reply to S with "correct guess". If π = π , mark the record interrupted and reply with "wrong guess". -Upon receiving a query (NewKey, sid, ssid, Pi, sk) from the adversary S:
If there is a record of the form (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, π), and this is the first NewKey query for Pi, then:
• If this record is compromised, or either Pi or Pj is corrupted, then output (sid, ssid, sk) to player Pi.
• If this record is fresh, and there is a record (Pj, Pi, π ) with π = π, and a key sk was sent to Pj, and (Pj, Pi, π) was fresh at the time, then output (sid, ssid, sk ) to Pi.
• In any other case, pick a new random key sk of length K and send (sid, ssid, sk ) to Pi.
Either way, mark the record (sid, ssid, Pi, Pj, π) as completed. Fig. 10 . Ideal Functionality for PAKE FpwKE password (the session is then marked as compromised), the adversary is granted the right to fully determine its session key. There is in fact nothing lost by allowing it to determine the key. In case of wrong guess (the session is then marked as interrupted), the two players are given independently-chosen random keys. A session that is nor compromised nor interrupted is called fresh, which is its initial status.
Finally notice that the functionality is not in charge of providing the password(s) to the participants. The passwords are chosen by the environment which then hands them to the parties as inputs. This guarantees security even in the case where two honest players execute the protocol with two different passwords: This models, for instance, the case where a user mistypes its password. It also implies that the security is preserved for all password distributions (not necessarily the uniform one) and in all situations where the password, are related passwords, are used in different protocols. Also note that allowing the environment to choose the passwords guarantees forward secrecy.
In case of corruption, the adversary learns the password of the corrupted player, after the NewKey-query, it additionally learns the session key.
B Cramer-Shoup Encryption on Vectors
B.1 The Computational Assumption
Definition 9 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)). The Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption says that, in a group (p, G, g), when we are given (g a , g b , g c ) for unknown random a, b $ ← Z p , it is hard to decide whether c = ab mod p (a DH tuple) or c $ ← Z p (a random tuple).
We denote by Adv ddh G (t) the best advantage an adversary can have in distinguishing a DH tuple from a random tuple in the group G within time t.
B.2 Description of the Cramer Shoup Encryption on Vectors
Labeled Cramer-Shoup Encryption. The labeled Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme works in a cyclic group G of prime order p, with two independent generators g and h. For random scalars x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z $ ← Z p , we set sk = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z) to be the private decryption key and pk = (g, h, c = g x 1 h x 2 , d = g y 1 h y 2 , f = g z , H) to be the public encryption key, where H is a random collision-resistant hash function from H (actually, second-preimage resistance is enough).
If M ∈ G, the Cramer-Shoup encryption is defined as CS pk (M ; r) = (u = g r , v = h r , e = f r · M, w = (cd θ ) r ), where θ = H ( , u, v, e) . Such a ciphertext C = (u, v, e, w) is decrypted by M = e/u z , after having checked the validity of the ciphertext: w ? = u x 1 +θy 1 v x 2 +θy 2 . This encryption scheme is well-known to be IND-CCA under the DDH assumption. Labeled Cramer-Shoup Encryption on Vectors. The above scheme can be extended to encrypt vectors of group elements 
Proof. Let us be given a tuple (g, h, u, v) ∈ G 4 . We choose random scalars x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z $ ← Z p , and set sk = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z) and pk = (g, h, c = g
, where H is a random collisionresistant hash function from H. We now consider an IND-CCA adversary on m-element vectors.
Game G 0 : With the above setup, we play the IND-CCA game where the challenge ciphertext is on M , that is chosen at random among the two vectors outputted by the adversary in the FIND stage. Game G 1 : In this game, instead of setting f = g z , one sets f = g z 1 h z 2 , which essentially means that z = z 1 + sz 2 , where h = g s . Then, the decryption works as follows: for i = 1, . . . , m, relatively to the label . One can note that the decryption algorithm yields the same result for correct ciphertexts (i.e., ciphertexts such that, for i = 1, . . . , m, u i = g r i and v i = h r i for some r i ): u , for all i, with non-negligible probability. Let us indeed consider such incorrect ciphertext. For some index i, w i = u
, but u i = g r i and v i = h r i with r i = r i . By taking the discrete logarithm in base g, and by setting δ i = r i − r i , we get:
Since c and d do not reveal any information about x 2 and y 2 , sδ i (x 2 + θy 2 ) is unpredictable and thus the correct value for w i is unpredicatble too. An incorrect ciphertext is declared valid with probability less than m/p, and thus the distance between the two games is bounded by mq d /p, where q d is the number of decryption queries. Game G 2 : In this game the challenge ciphertext is generated following the new decryption approach:
, with all the tuples (g, h, u * i , v * i ) being DH tuples. As already shown above, since truly DH tuples are used, this makes no difference. Game G 3 : In this game, the challenge ciphertext C * = (u * i , v * i , e * i , w * i ) i , uses tuples (u * i , v * i , e * i , w * i ) randomly and independently chosen in G 4 . In order to bound the distance between the two games, we use a sequence of hybrid games: in G j , for i ≤ j, (g, h, u * i , v * i ) are DH tuples and
, w * i ) are randomly and independently chosen in G 4 . One can note that G 0 is exactly G 3 , while G m is G 2 . Let us modify a little bit G j into G j , in which (g, h, u, v) is a DH tuple and u
x 2 +θ * y 2 . This does not change anything. We now alter it into G j , where
, where δ = r − r, with u = g r and v = h r , and thus δ = 0 with overwhelming probability, as well as z 2 = 0. In addition, z 2 is totally unpredictable, unless some incorrect ciphertexts are decrypted. As a conclusion, unless some incorrect ciphertexts are decrypted, e * j is totally unpredictable. But an incorrect ciphertext C = (u i , v i , e i , w i ) i is decrypted if for some i log c = x 1 + sx 2 log d = y 1 + sy 2 log w * j = r(x 1 + θ * y 1 ) + sr (x 2 + θ * y 2 ) log w i = r i (x 1 + θy 1 ) + sr i (x 2 + θy 2 ) whereas δ i = r i − r i = 0. The determinant of the system is s 2 δδ i (θ * − θ), which is non-zero, unless θ * = θ. But two cases only are possible:
, then the query is not allowed. Therefore, the determinant being non-zero, w i is unpredictable and thus the probability that at least one incorrect ciphertext is declared valid is bounded by mq d /p. In addition, w * j is also unpredictable. This means that G j is exactly G j−1 . but the distance between the two games is bounded by mq d /p + 2Adv ddh G (t), assuming no collision for H. Eventually, the distance between G 2 and G 3 is bounded by m 2 q d /p + 2mAdv
This concludes the proof since in the last game, the values e * i are independent of the message, and thus of the bit involved in the security game: the advantage of the adversary is 0.
We now provide a stronger security notion for encryption of vectors, which is useful for our application to E 2 -commitments.
B.3 Vector-Indistinguishability with Partial Opening, under Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
New Security Notion. In our applications, when encrypting vectors, the adversary will get some of the random coins used for encryption. We thus define a stronger security notion:
Vector-indistinguishability with partial opening, under chosen-ciphertext attacks: this security notion VIND-PO-CCA can be formalized by the following experiments Exp vind-po-cca-b A (K), where the adversary A keeps some internal state between the various calls FIND and GUESS, and makes use of the above ODecrypt oracle. However, Encrypt * has an additional input ∆, that consists of the common values in M 0 and M 1 , and ⊥ at the places of distinct values. It also outputs the values r that allow to check that C * actually encrypts a vector M that corresponds to ∆ (i.e., that is equal to ∆ for places different than ⊥). The exact definition of these values r depend on the actual encryption scheme.
This models the fact that when distinct random coins are used for each components of the vector, the random coins of the common components can be revealed, it should not help to distinguish which vector has been encrypted.
These experiments Exp vind-po-cca-b A (K) define the advantages Adv vind-po-cca E (A, K) and Adv vind-po-cca E (t). As above, we will use Adv vind-po-cca E (m, q d , γ, t) to make precise the length m of the vectors, and to bound by q d the number of decryption queries and by γ the number of distinct values in the pairs of vectors.
Labeled Cramer-Shoup Encryption on Vectors. For the Cramer-Shoup encryption on vectors MCS, the values r output by Encrypt * are the random coins r i corresponding to to the common components of M 0 and M 1 (i.e., for i such that M 0,i = M 1,i = ∆ i ). These values are sufficient to check that C * actually encrypts a vector corresponding to ∆.
We can prove that MCS is VIND-PO-CCA using a slight variant of the IND-CCA proofs given in Section B.2. More precisely, we use the same games except that for i such that M 0,i = M 1,i , in Games G 2 and G 3 , we compute u * i and v * i as in Game G 1 : u * i = g r i and v * i = h r i for a random scalar r i . The hybrid technique to prove the indistinguishability of G 2 and G 3 uses γ steps only (instead of m steps), with γ the number of distinct components. Finally, we get:
C Useful SPHFs
In this appendix, we show three constructions of SPHF for E 2 C and summarize their costs. We use the framework from [BBC + 13].
C.1 Construction of the SPHFs
The language we are interested in is the language of valid commitments C = (a, b) ∈ G m 2 × G 8m 1 under label of some fixed vector M , where the witness is the decommitment information δ = s = (s i,M i ) i ∈ Z m p . More precisely, a word C is in the language if and only if there exists δ and
with = ( , a) and θ = H( , (u i,j , v i,j , e i,j ) i,j ). If we set b i,j = (u i,j , v i,j , e i,j , w i,j ) i,j , we can write the previous conjunction as: for all i = 1, . . . , m,
Since e is non-degenerated, we finally remark that we can eliminate the need of d i,M i , by lifting everything in G T , and checking that, first, the ciphertexts are all valid and, second, the plaintexts satisfy the appropriate relations:
e(e i,M i , g 2 ) = e(f
From these expressions we can derive three SPHFs.
KV-SPHF.
A KV-SPHF is a SPHF for which hp does not depend on C and the smoothness holds even if the adversary can see hp before choosing C (see [BBC + 13] for a precise definition). Let us first show how to construct a KV-SPHF checking the previous condition for only a fixed index i. For this purpose, we use the following matrices (for the framework of [BBC + 13]:
With hk = (η 1 , η 2 , α, β, µ)
Eventually, to check that C actually commits to M = (M i ) i , we can define a KV-SPHF, as follows:
Since δ = (s i,M i ) i , this will allow the one-round PAKE, described in Section 6.
CS-SPHF.
When C is sent before hp, we can use a CS-SPHF instead of a KV-SPHF (for which the smoothness holds only when the adversary cannot see hp before choosing C). Here is a more efficient CS-SPHF, with a common projection key for all the components, but an additional random ε 1 :
which leads to
More precisely, following the framework from [BBC + 13], since hp is not known at the time C is generated, to prove that the resulting CS-SPHF is smooth, we just need to prove that for any invalid C (not in the language), the probability that Θ(C) is not a linear combination of the rows of Γ (C) is overwhelming, over the random choice of ε. Indeed, if Θ(C) is independent of rows of Γ (C), H is completely unpredictable even given hp. Let us indeed consider an invalid commitment C, and let us write
, which is always possible if we suppose g 1 , h 1 , f 1 and cd θ are all generators 2 . Then, since C is invalid, there exists some i * , such that either t i * = s i * or s i * = s i * or s i * = s i * . Let us suppose t i * = s i * . The other cases are similar. Then we remark that for Θ(C) to be linearly dependent of rows of Γ , it is necessary that e( i v ε i−1
since the first coefficient of the linear combination is necessary λ 1 = g
. This implies that:
, by looking at the discrete logarithm in base e(g 1 , g 2 ). In other words ε has to be a root of the m-degree polynomial i (t i − s i )X i , which is not null because t i = s i . This polynomial has at most m roots, and so at most m distinct ε (among the p possible ε in Z p ) lead to a Θ(C) linearly dependent of rows of Γ . Finally, we conclude that, with probablity at least 1 − m/p, Θ(C) is independent of rows of Γ . This proves the smoothness of the SPHF.
GL-SPHF.
When C is sent in advance, and thus known when generating hp, as in the Oblivious Transfer protocol described in Section 7, we can use a more efficient GL-SPHF instead of a CS-SPHF:
It is easy to extend to the case where some of them are not generators (i.e., are equal to 1). and:
C.2 Complexity
In Table 3 , we summarize the cost of the various SPHFs. We remark that in the CS-SPHF and GL-SPHF, if m = 1, we do not need ε. That is why this case is handled separately. In all cases, the hash value consists of 1 group element in G T . In practice we use an entropy extractor on this hash value. 
D Security Proofs
Each flow in the concrete protocols should include the tuple (sid, ssid, P i , P j ), but we omit it for the sake of simplicity. This tuple is needed for the queries the simulator to asks to the ideal functionality (in the description of the ideal games at the end of each sequence of games below).
D.1 Proof of Theorem 4 (UC-Secure Commitment from a Labeled E 2 -Commitment)
We first prove this theorem in the case the labeled E 2 -commitment scheme C is additionally strongly-bindingextractable, and explain the difference with strong-simulation-indistinguishability afterwards.
With Strong-Binding-Extractability. We thus exhibit a sequence of games. The sequence starts from the real game, where the adversary A interacts with real players and ends with the ideal game, where we have built a simulator S that makes the interface between the ideal functionality F and the adversary A. Essentially, one first makes the setup algorithm additionally output the trapdoor (setup-indistinguishability); one can then replace all the commitment queries by simulated (fake) commitments (simulation-indistinguishability). Eventually, when simulating the receiver, the simulator extracts the committed value x (using ExtCom), which should be the same as the one that will be open later (strong-binding-extractability). One can then split the simulation, to open it when required only with the appropriate information: the committed value sent be the environment is not required anymore. More details follow:
Game G 0 : This is the real game. Game G 1 : In this game, the simulator generates correctly every flows from the honest players, as they would do themselves, knowing the inputs x sent by the environment to the senders. In case of corruption, the simulator can give the internal data generated on behalf of the honest players. Game G 2 : In this game, we just replace the setup algorithm SetupCom by SetupComT that additionally outputs the trapdoor (ρ, τ ) $ ← SetupComT(1 K ), but nothing else changes, which does not alter much the view of the environment under setup indistinguishability. Corruptions are handled the same way.
Game G 3 : We first deal with honest senders: we replace all the commitments (C, δ) $ ← Com (x) with = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ) in Step 1. of the commit phase of honest players by simulated commitments (C, δ) $ ← SCom (τ, x), which means (C, eqk) $ ← SimCom (τ ) and δ ← OpenCom (eqk, C, x). We then store ( , x, C) in Λ.
With an hybrid proof, applying the Exp sim-ind security game for each step, in which SCom is used as an atomic operation in which the simulator does not see the intermediate values, and in particular the equivocation key, one can show the indistinguishability of the two games. In case of corruption of the sender, one learns the already known value x. Game G 4 : We now deal with honest receivers: when receiving a fresh commitment C from the adversary or a replay from another session (and thus under a different label), the simulator extracts the committed value x. If the adversary later opens to a different value at the decommit phase, the simulator rejects it.
If it was accepted in the previous game, then one breaks the strong-binding-extractability.
More generally, the trapdoor correctness ensures that valid decommitments (accepted in the previous game) will be accepted in this game too, which makes almost no difference between the two games, but with probability bounded by Succ s-bind-ext C (t). Note that in the experiment Exp s-bind-ext , the adversary has access to both the fake commitment oracle (SCom) and the extraction oracle (ExtCom), which are indeed required here. Game G 5 : We do not use anymore the knowledge of x: the simulator knows the trapdoor τ and generates (C, eqk) $ ← SimCom (τ ), with = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ), to send C during the commit phase of honest players. When receiving a Revealed-message on x, it then generates δ ← OpenCom (eqk, C, x) to actually open the commitment. We essentially break the atomic SCom in the two separated processes SimCom and OpenCom. This does not change anything from the previous game except that Λ is first filled with ( , ⊥, C) at the commit time and then updated to ( , x, C) at the opening time. In case of corruption of the sender, one learns the committed value that is thereafter used at the decommit phase for x. Game G 6 : We can now make use of the functionality, which leads to the following simulator:
-when receiving a commitment C from the adversary, and thus either freshly generated by the adversary or a replay of a commitment C generated by the simulator in another session (with a different label), the simulator extracts the committed value x, and uses it to send a Commit message to the ideal functionality. A dummy value is used in case of bad extraction; -when receiving a Receipt-message, which means that an honest player has committed a value, the simulator generates (C, eqk) $ ← SimCom (τ ), with = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ), to send C during the commit phase of the honest player; -when receiving (x, δ), if the verification succeeds, the simulator asks for a Reveal query to the ideal functionality; -when receiving a Revealed-message on x, it then generates δ ← OpenCom (eqk, C, x) to actually open the commitment. Any corruption just reveals x earlier, which allows a correct simulation of the opening.
With Strong-Simulation-Indistinguishability. In the other case, where the labeled E 2 -commitment is additionally strongly-simulation-indistinguishable, we can just first simulate the receiver before modifying the simulation of the sender with fake commitments: one will first apply extractability and then strong-simulationindistinguishability. This concretely means that we swap G 3 and G 4 . This leads to the same simulator in G 6 . Cost of the Reductions. More precisely, for any environment, its advantage in distinguishing the ideal world (with the ideal functionality from Figure 4 ) and the real world (with the commitment scheme C) is bounded by both Adv Setup-indistinguishability. this is trivially satisfied since the two setup algorithms are exactly the same but just output the trapdoor or not, and thus Adv setup-ind E 2 C (t) = 0 for any t.
(t, ε)-strong-simulation-indistinguishability. Let us build a sequence of games from the security experiment with b = 1 to the experiment with b = 0. We stress that SCom does not only output
where the s i,j 's are the random coins in the multi-Cramer-Shoup encryption.
1. We first start with the real game with b = 1 (use of SCom for the challenge commitment), with all the trapdoors to emulate the oracles; 2. the simulator now knows the equivocation trapdoor to emulate the SCom-oracle, but has just access to the decryption oracle to emulate the ExtCom-oracle; 3. for the challenge oracle on x = (x i ) i , the simulator uses r i,1−x i = 0, which leads to the plaintexts d i,1−x i = 1 that are thereafter encrypted under the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. Applying the VIND-PO-CCA security of the MCS encryption scheme, in which the m components of the vector that correspond to the committed vector x are the same in the two 2m-long vectors, one can note that the bias is upper-bounded by Adv In conclusion, one thus gets Adv
Let us build a sequence of games from the security experiment to an attack to the DDH in G 2 .
1. we first start with the real game, with all the trapdoors to emulate the oracles; 2. the simulator replaces all the SCom-oracle queries by Com-oracle queries. With an hybrid proof, where we replace sequentially the SCom emulations by Com emulations, as above, one introduces a bias upperbounded by q c · Adv
(t), and thus q c · Adv
, where q c is the number of SCom-queries and q d the number of extract queries; 3. the simulator does not need any more the equivocation trapdoor, but can still extract the correct d i,x j , by decrypting the Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts, to open the commitment with e(g 1 , a i /T x i ) = e(d i,x i , g 2 ).
When the adversary breaks the strong-binding-extractability, it provides C with a valid opening (M , δ), whereas C extracts to M = M (possibly ⊥).
Since opening/verification in one way is possible M , this means that the Cramer-Shoup decryption gives at least one valid opening for each a i . But because of the different extraction output M , extraction technique is ambiguous on C: for an index i, it can provide two different opening values for a i , which breaks the DDH assumption in G 2 .
In conclusion, one thus gets Succ
, where q c is the number of SCom-queries and q d the number of extract queries. Robustness. In the above proof of strong-binding-extractability, as soon as different opening values exist, by decrypting the Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts, one breaks the DDH assumption in G 2 : Succ To prove this theorem, we exhibit a sequence of games. The sequence starts from the real game, where the adversary A interacts with real players and ends with the ideal game, where we have built a simulator S that makes the interface between the ideal functionality F pwKE and the adversary A.
For the sake of simplicity, since the protocol is fully symmetric in P i and P j , we describe the simulation for player P i in order to simplify the notations.
We say that a flow is oracle-generated if the pair (hp, C) was sent by an honest player (or the simulator) and received without any alteration by the adversary. It is said non-oracle-generated otherwise.
Game G 0 : This is the real game. Game G 1 : First, in this game, the simulator generates correctly every flow from the honest players, as they would do themselves, knowing the inputs π i and π j sent by the environment to the players. In case of corruption, the simulator can give the internal data generated on behalf of the honest players. In the following, Step 1. is always generated honestly by the simulator, since the hashing and projection keys do not depend on any private value. Game G 2 : We now replace the setup algorithm SetupCom by SetupComT that additionally outputs the trapdoor (ρ, τ ) $ ← SetupComT(1 K ), but nothing else changes, which does not alter much the view of the environment under setup indistinguishability. Corruptions are handled the same way. Game G 3 : In this game, we deal with the case where P i receives a flow oracle-generated from P j , and they have identical passwords. When P i receives an oracle-generated flow from P j , the simulator checks whether the two passwords sent by the environment for P i and P j are identical. If so, S computes both hash values using Hash and not ProjHash. More precisely, it computes
. If the passwords are distinct, it does not change anything. Recall that it is able to do so since it generated the hashing keys on their behalf. Thanks to the correctness of the SPHF, this game is indistinguishable from the former one. Game G 4 : In the next two games, we deal with the case where P i receives a flow oracle-generated from P j , but P j has been corrupted, and they have distinct passwords. In this case, S has received the password π j of P j at the corruption time of P j (π j was anyway already known), and knows the corresponding opening data δ j , generated with the commitment by the Com-call. If this password is the same, it does not change anything. If the passwords are distinct, then S computes H i as before, but chooses H j at random: this means that we replace Hash(hk i , L π i , ( j , C j )) by a random value, while C j has been simulated by Com with an opening value δ j for π j = π i .
With an hybrid proof, applying the Exp c-smooth security game, with x = π i and x = π j (since C j is generated by Com on π j , it thus extracts on x = π j ), one proves this game is indistinguishable from the former one. Game G 5 : We conclude for this case: if the passwords are distinct, P i chooses a random key.
Since this is a simple syntactical change from the former game, this game is perfectly indistinguishable from it. Game G 6 : In this game, we simulate the commitments sent by the honest players using the trapdoors generated by the setup algorithm SetupComT. More precisely, we replace the commitment
With an hybrid proof, applying the Exp sim-ind security game for each player, in which SCom is used as an atomic operation in which the simulator does not see the intermediate values, and in particular the equivocation key, one can show the indistinguishability of the two games. In case of corruption of the honest player P i , one learns the already known value π i . If the corruption occurs before the erasures, we are able to provide the adversary with coherent values (δ i has been computed using the correct value π i ). If the corruption occurs in the end, we are able to give the adversary the (honestly computed) session key. Unless we precise it, all the corruptions are dealt with in the same way in the following games. Game G 7 : In the next two games, we deal with the case where P i receives a flow oracle-generated from P j , and P j is still honest, and they have distinct passwords. The simulator checks whether the two passwords sent by the environment for P i and P j are distinct. If so, S remplaces Hash(hk j , L π j , ( i , C i )) by a random value, the first time it is computed (and uses the same random value the second time it is computed by the partner, and thus only if this is the same password). Under the pseudo-randomness, with an hybrid proof, applying the Exp c-ps-rand security game on each simulation of the honest players with SCom giving C only, and with x = π j and x a dummy value different from any password, one can show the indistinguishability of the two games. Actually, since we -if the flow (C j , hp j ) is non-oracle-generated, S extracts the password π j (or set it as a dummy value in case of failure of extaction). S then asked for a TestPwd-query to the functionality to check whether π j is the password of P i . If this password is correct, S sets π i = π j , computes δ i ← OpenCom i (eqk i , C i , π i ), as well as H j and H i , and then sk i , that is passed to the NewKeyquery (compromised case). If the password is incorrect, S asks the NewKey-query with a random key (interrupted case).
-if the flow (C j , hp j ) is oracle-generated but the associated P j has been corrupted, then S has recovered its password π j and δ j . It can thus compute sk j , that is passed to the NewKey-query (corrupted case). -if the flow (C j , hp j ) is oracle-generated and the associated P j is still uncorrupted, S asks the NewKey-query with a random key (normal case). One can remark that the NewKey-queries will send back the same kinds of session keys to the environment as in Game G 11 : if a player is corrupted, the really computed key is sent back, in case of impersonation attempt, the TestPwd-query will address the appropriate situation (correct or incorrect guess), and if the two players are honest, the NewKey-query also addresses the appropriate situation (same or different passwords).
More precisely, we have proven that for any environment, its advantage in distinguishing the ideal world (with the ideal functionality from Figure 10 ) and the real world (with the protocol from Figure 7 ) is bounded by Adv
, where q is the number of activated players and t its running time.
D.4 Proof of Theorem 8 (UC-Secure OT from an SPHF-Friendly Commitment)
To prove this theorem, we exhibit a sequence of games. The sequence starts from the real game, where the adversary A interacts with real players and ends with the ideal game, where we have built a simulator S that makes the interface between the ideal functionality F and the adversary A. We prove the adaptive version of the protocol. The proof of the static version can be obtained by removing the parts related to adaptive version from the proof below.
Essentially, one first makes the setup algorithm additionally output the trapdoor (setup-indistinguishability); one can then replace all the commitment queries by simulated (fake) commitments (simulationindistinguishability). When the sender submits the values (hp i , M i ) i the simulator can extract all the message thanks to the trapdoor and get the witnesses for each indices. This allows to simulate the Send-query to the ideal functionality. Eventually, when simulating the honest senders, the simulator extracts the committed value s, to set hp s and M s consistent with m s , the other values can be random. More details follow: Game G 0 : This is the real game. Game G 1 : In this game, the simulator generates correctly every flow from the honest players, as they would do themselves, knowing the inputs (m 1 , . . . , m k ) and s sent by the environment to the sender and the receiver. In all the subsequent games, the players use the label = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ). In case of corruption, the simulator can give the internal data generated on behalf of the honest players. Game G 2 : In this game, we just replace the setup algorithm SetupCom by SetupComT that additionally outputs the trapdoor (ρ, τ ) $ ← SetupComT(1 K ), but nothing else changes, which does not alter much the view of the environment under setup indistinguishability. Corruptions are handled the same way. Game G 3 : We first deal with honest senders P i : when receiving a commitment C, the simulator extracts the committed value s. Instead of computing the key K t , for t = 1, . . . , k with the hash function, it chooses K t $ ← G for t = s. With an hybrid proof, applying the smoothness (see Figure 6 -left), for every honest sender, on every index t = s, since C is extracted to s, for any t = s, the hash value is indistinguishable from a random value. In case of corruption, everything has been erased. This game is thus indistinguishable from the previous one under the smoothness.
Game G 4 : Still in this case, when receiving a commitment C, the simulator extracts the committed value s. Instead of proceeding as the sender would do on (m 1 , . . . , m k ), the simulator proceeds on (m 1 , . . . , m k ), with m s = m s , but m t = 0 for all t = s. Since the masks K t , for t = s, are random, this game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one. Game G 5 : We now deal with honest receivers P j : we replace all the commitments (C, δ) $ ← Com (s) with = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ) in Step 1 of the index query phase of honest receivers by simulated commitments (C, δ) $ ← SCom (τ, s), which means (C, eqk) $ ← SimCom (τ ) and δ ← OpenCom (eqk, C, s). We then store ( , s, C, δ) in Λ.
With an hybrid proof, applying the Exp s-sim-ind security game for each session, in which SCom is used as an atomic operation in which the simulator does not see the intermediate values, and in particular the equivocation key, one can show the indistinguishability of the two games. In case of corruption of the receiver, one learns the already known value s. Game G 6 : We deal with the generation of R for honest senders P i on honestly-generated queries (adaptive case only): if P i and P j are honest at least until P i received the second flow, the simulator sets R = F (S ) for both P i and P j , with S a random value, instead of R = F (S).
With an hybrid proof, applying the IND-CPA property for each session, one can show the indistinguishability of this game with the previous one. Game G 7 : Still in the same case, the simulator sets R as a random value, instead of R = F (S ).
With an hybrid proof, applying the PRF property for each session, one can show the indistinguishability of this game with the previous one. Game G 8 : We now deal with the generation of K s for honest senders P i on honestly-generated queries: -in the static case (the pre-flow is not necessary, and thus we assume R = 0) the simulator chooses K s $ ← G (for t = s, the simulator already chooses K t $ ← G), where s is the index given by the ideal functionality to the honest receiver P j . With an hybrid proof, applying the pseudo-randomness (see Figure 6 -right), for every honest sender, the hash value is indistinguishable from a random value, because the adversary does not know any decommitments information δ for C; -in the adaptive case, and thus with the additional random mask R, one can send a random M s , and K s can be computed later (when P j actually receives its flow). As above, but only of P j has not been corrupted before receiving its flow, the simulator chooses K s $ ← G. With an hybrid proof, applying the pseudo-randomness (see Figure 6 -right), for every honest sender, the hash value is indistinguishable from a random value, because the adversary does not know any decommitments information δ for C. If the player P j involved in the pseudo-randomness game gets corrupted (but δ is unknown) we are not in this case, and we can thus abort it. In case of corruption of P i , everything has been erased. In case of corruption of the receiver P j , and thus receiving the value m s , the simulator chooses R (because it was a random value unknown to the adversary and all the other K t are independent random values too) such that
This game is thus indistinguishable from the previous one under the pseudo-randomness. Game G 9 : Still in this case, the simulator proceeds on (m 1 , . . . , m k ), with m t = 0 for all i. Since the masks K t ⊕ R, for any t = 1, . . . , k, are independent random values (the K t , for t = s are independent random values, and K s is also independently random in the static case, while R is independently random in the adaptive case), this game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one. We remark that it is therefore no more necessary to know the index s given by the ideal functionality to the honest receiver P j , to simulate P i (but it is still necessary to simulate P j ). Game G 10 : We do not use anymore the knowledge of s when simulating an honest receiver P j : the simulator generates (C, eqk) $ ← SimCom (τ ), with = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ), to send C during the index query phase of honest receivers. It then stores ( , ⊥, C, eqk) in Λ. We essentially break the atomic SCom in the two separated processes SimCom and OpenCom. This does not change anything from the previous game since δ is never revealed. Λ is first filled with ( , ⊥, C, eqk), it can be updated with correct values in case of corruption of the receiver. When it thereafter receives (Send, sid, ssid, P i , P j , (hp 1 , M 1 , . . . , hp k , M k )) from the adversary, the simulator computes, for i = 1, . . . , k, δ i ← OpenCom (eqk, C, i), K i ← ProjHash(hp i , ( , L i ), C, δ i ) and m i = K i ⊕ R ⊕ M i . This provides the database submitted by the sender. Game G 11 : We can now make use of the functionality, which leads to the following simulator:
-when receiving a Send-message from the ideal functionnality, which means that an honest sender has sent a pre-flow, the simulator generates a key pair (pk, sk) $ ← KeyGen(1 K ) and sends pk as pre-flow; -after receiving a pre-flow pk (from an honest or a corrupted sender) and a Receive-message from the ideal functionality, which means that an honest receiver has sent an index query, the simulator generates (C, eqk) $ ← SimCom (τ ) and c $ ← Encrypt(pk, S), with = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ) and R a random value, to send C and c during the index query phase of the honest receiver; -when receiving a commitment C and a ciphertext c, generated by the adversary (from a corrupted receiver), the simulator extracts the committed value s, and uses it to send a Receive-message to the ideal functionality (and also decrypts the ciphertext c as S, and computes R = F (S)); -when receiving (hp 1 , M 1 , . . . , hp k , M k ) from the adversary (a corrupted sender), the simulator computes, for i = 1, . . . , k, δ i ← OpenCom (eqk, C, i), K i ← ProjHash(hp i , L i , ( , C), δ i ) and m i = K i ⊕ R ⊕ M i . It uses them to send a Send-message to the ideal functionality. -when receiving a Received-message from the ideal functionality, together with m s , on behalf of a corrupted receiver, from the extracted s, instead of proceeding as the sender would do on (m 1 , . . . , m k ), the simulator proceeds on (m 1 , . . . , m k ), with m s = m s , but m i = 0 for all i = s; -when receiving a commitment C and a ciphertext c, generated by an honest sender (i.e., by the simulator itself), the simulator proceeds as above on (m 1 , . . . , m k ), with m i = 0 for all i, but it chooses R uniformly at random instead of choosing it as R = F (S); in case of corruption afterward, the simulator will adapt R such that R ⊕ ProjHash(hp s , L s , ( , C), δ s ) ⊕ M s = m s , where m s is the message actually received by the receiver. Any corruption either reveals s earlier, which allows a correct simulation of the receiver, or reveals (m 1 , . . . , m k ) earlier, which allows a correct simulation of the sender. When the sender has sent his flow, he has already erased all his random coins. However, there would have been an issue when the receiver is corrupted after the sender has sent is flow, but before the receiver receives it, since he has kept δ s : this would enable the adversary to recover m s from M s and hp s . This is the goal of the epheremal mask R that provides a secure channel.
As a consequence, the distance between the first and the last games is bounded by where q s is the number of concurrent sessions and t the running time of the distinguisher.
E Concrete Instantiations
UC-Secure Password-Authenticated Key Exchange. A concrete instantiation of our generic PAKE construction from Figure 7 is presented in Figure 11 . UC-Secure Oblivious Transfert Protocol. A concrete instantiation of our generic OT constructions from Figure 8 is presented in Figure 12 . No PRG is actually required here, and we can choose S $ ← G 1 and R = e(S, g 2 ). The first flow and the ciphertext c needs not to be sent if only static security is required (in this case R = 1).
